

# **First Impressions of the 2000 Census of China\***

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The 2000 Census of China is most obviously notable for its grand scale. Requiring 10,000 tons of paper for questionnaires, five million enumerators and a million supervisors, it was at the very least an impressive logistical feat. But this census is notable, too, for its design and expanded content, reflecting China's increasing complexity and the rising demand for social data to inform policy. It is notable as well for the unprecedented challenges it encountered in the field, conducted as it was under an administrative regime that is, in important respects, inimical to accurate census reporting. The preliminary results mirror China's continued social progress and apparent success in the drive to curtail population growth. This report briefly describes the 2000 census, sketches the highlights of preliminary tabulations, and discusses issues related to data quality.

## Innovations

Several important innovations distinguish China's fifth census from the four previous ones. For the first time, a confidentiality statement appears on the census form; the census forms are designed for optical character scanning instead of manual data entry; and census documents can be accessed from an official census web site. There are also important changes to the census questionnaire. There is both a short and a long form, with the latter administered to a ten percent sample of households in most provinces (to ten percent of enumeration districts in remote areas). The long form provides unprecedented scope for data collection on issues of concern to China's policymakers, including housing, migration, and employment.

The short form contains a set of standard items collected for every person in every household, including age, sex, nationality, registration status, and educational level. Items on migrant status, occupation, and marital status that were collected from all households in the 1990 census were in the 2000 census relegated to the long form. Every household is queried about births in the previous year, permitting a crude birth rate and sex ratio of births to be calculated for the entire population, but more detailed fertility questions are contained on the long form. Two items about housing—number of rooms and floor area—are also contained on the short form, but the long form explores housing in considerable detail.

Housing is a pressing issue in contemporary China. In the past decade housing reform policies have substantially privatized urban housing and opened a narrowly circumscribed housing market. A shift to an open market in housing, although not imminent, it is on the horizon. The census long form contains no less than fifteen items of direct relevance to this delicate transition, including questions on the utilization and age of housing, construction materials, fuel use, source of water, the character of sanitary facilities, housing tenure, and the value or monthly rent of the property.

Migration is another problem with enormous social implications. China's economic reforms have brought a rising tide of rural to urban migration. But the policies that liberated peasants from the land and created an urban labor market coexist uneasily with remnant structures of the socialist state. Chinese citizens are still officially divided

between those with urban and rural household registrations. The former constitute a virtual hereditary caste entitled to educational benefits, jobs, and other welfare guarantees, in contrast to migrants in cities who have no perquisites and whose urban foothold is generally precarious. In other countries, schooling facilitates the assimilation of urban migrants. In China, where urban polities bear no responsibility for migrants, the “floating population” has emerged as a large and perduring urban underclass, variously estimated at between 100 and 200 million persons. The unwinding of this system, now cautiously advanced in policies that dilute urban privilege, will take at least a generation. In the mean time, understanding population movement is a high priority.

The census short form contains four questions on household members absent for less than six months, which should yield an estimate of the number and provenance of the short-term floating population. The census long form contains nine items related to household registration and migration, items that classify migrants with considerable spatial and temporal precision. The 1990 census only distinguished mobility across county boundaries; the 2000 census can chart mobility across township and street committee boundaries. The 1990 census could only detect movement in the five years prior to the census; the 2000 census records place of birth as well as location of last residence, and it records the year of last move. As precise as they are, these items will not permit a full assessment of the floating population because the census is a quasi *de jure* enumeration that counts people at their legal residence if they have been away from that residence for less than six months. But this six-month reference period is itself an important revision of the one-year reference period of previous censuses. By placing

more migrants at their current abode rather than at their place of registration, it gives the census a more *de facto* cast. Yet by counting those away from home for less than six months at their legal instead of actual residence, it will still undercount migrants and understate their influence on urban populations.

Concern with the floating population explains another break with census tradition, the standard time. Each of China's four previous censuses set July 1 as the standard time; the Fifth Census set November 1. The inadvisability of census work in hot summer weather is cited as one reason for this change, but the crucial rationale concerns the effort to enumerate migrants at their actual rather than legal residence (Zhang 1998:7).

Sojourning migrants generally return to their natal home for Spring Festival, which in the year 2000 occurred in February. Coming within six months of Spring Festival, a July 1 standard time would have placed many migrants at their legal rather than at their actual residence and thus seriously undermined the estimate of long-term urban migrants.

Unemployment was foreign to the vocabulary of socialism, if not the reality, but in the reform era it has emerged as a volatile problem. Decollectivization in the early 1980s cast underemployed peasants into the labor market, while market forces continue to produce layoffs and forced early retirements in moribund state owned enterprises. Yet despite its importance, unemployment has been virtually unmeasurable due to the variety of guises under which unemployed workers are categorized (Solinger 2001). The census long form contains items on employment that address this problem. In addition to the occupation and industry items that appear in previous censuses, there are questions about

work for pay in the week prior to the census. Another item classifies the unemployed and inquires about their source of support. These items should permit a basic but systematic appraisal of economic activity and unemployment.

## Preliminary Data

As of this writing, the main source of published data from the census is the *Essential Figures on 2000 Population Census of China* (Population Census Office 2001). There is also a series of provincial census communiqués, available from the official census web site (<http://www.p2000.gov.cn/p2000/index.htm>). The data released thus far only provide the basis for very general and tentative conclusions.

## National Trends

With 1.265 billion persons as of November 1, 2000, the People's Republic of China accounts for approximately 21 percent of the human population. China is still the most populous nation, a title it will not cede to India for another four to five decades (Dyson 2001). China's population grew more slowly in the past decade than in any decade since the founding of the PRC. The four intercensal periods shown in Table 1 neatly frame the stages of demographic transition, with growth peaking at 2.07 percent in the years 1964-1982, dropping to 1.42 percent in the years 1982-1990, and dropping further to 1.07 percent in the past decade. It may be inferred that reductions in fertility account for the decline in population growth, as there is no evidence that death rates rose in the decade. A possible alternative explanation would be a substantial undercount of

population in 2000 relative to the undercount in 1990. The problem of data quality will be considered in the following section.

Table 1 here

China's population is composed of a Han majority and 55 officially designated minority nationalities, of which minorities represented 8.4 percent in 2000. Decelerating growth of the minority population in the past decade has set Han and minority growth rates on a path toward convergence. Between 1982 and 1990 the minority population grew at an annual average rate of 3.83 percent, an exceptionally rapid rate produced by high natural increase as well as reclassifications of persons from Han to minority status (Poston 1993). In the 1990s minorities grew at 1.51 percent per year, less than half the rate of the previous decade. This trend likely reflects the successful extension of birth planning policies into previously exempt minority areas.

China has certainly urbanized in the past two decades, but frequently changing definitions of the urban population have made the measurement of urbanization one of the more treacherous areas of Chinese demography. The measurement problem can be observed in Table 2, which shows the urban population and percent urban as measured in recent censuses and SSB reports. The 1982 census put China's urban proportion at 20.5 percent, roughly where it had stood for the previous twenty years. This rose to 26.2 percent in 1990 and to 28.6 percent in the 1995 1% sample census, and to 30.9 percent in

the SSB estimate for 1999 (see Table 2). The 2000 census report of 36.1 percent is obviously inconsistent with the earlier estimates.

Table 2 here

The discontinuity involves two separate measurement issues. The first concerns the definition of an urban place. The 1982, 1990, and 2000 censuses each define urban places according to different criteria. In 1990, and through the ensuing decade, the urban population was defined by administrative categories: residence committees were uniformly counted as urban, and village committees were counted as rural unless they were administered under cities or towns at the prefectural level or above (Chan 1994). The urban definition used in the 2000 census departs from the strict administrative definition by promoting some village committees to urban status based on density measures and other criteria.<sup>1</sup> This revised definition more faithfully reflects the urban reality of densely populated industrialized settlements that are still under village administration.

The other, and no doubt more important, reason for the inconsistency is the revised method for determining census residence—the six-month reference period alluded to above. Under the 1990 census rules, rural migrants residing in a city for less than one year are counted at their place of registration. Under rules guiding the 2000 census, those residing in the city for six months or more would be counted at their urban abode.

Comparing the 2000 census estimate with that for 1999 it is apparent that the revised measure captures approximately 60 million more urban residents. Although still an underestimate of the urban proportion by the standards of a purely *de facto* census, the 2000 census moves the estimate closer to actuality. The urban trend is real, and represents a profound social revolution that, should it continue, will transform China into a mainly urban society in less than two decades.

Although China's population has "aged" over the past decade, it is far from elderly. In labor force terms, China has high productive potential, with 70 percent of the population in the 15-64 age range (see Table 3). The proportion of the population age 65 and over rose from 5.6 percent in 1990 to 7.0 percent in 2000. An even more rapid rise in the proportion over 65 will occur over the next few decades.

Table 3 here

Urban-rural differences suggest the forces that have shaped the age structure. Urban China, where the one child policy has been successfully enforced for two decades, has a relatively low proportion under age 15, and a larger proportion age 15-64. In the 2000 census 75.3 percent of urban Chinese were in the 15 to 64 age range, implying a dependency ratio that is extraordinarily low. Selective migratory flows in the 1990s probably reinforced this age pattern. As may be seen in Table 3, in 1990, rural and urban China had roughly equal proportions age 65 and over. By 2000 the proportion of rural

elderly exceeded that of urban, a counterintuitive result that can be explained by the flow of working age persons from rural to urban areas.

China's citizens were better educated at the end of the 1990s than at the beginning. Growth of the population with secondary and higher education was particularly rapid. Middle school graduates rose from about 23 for every hundred persons in 1990 to 34 in 2000. Those with any higher education remain a tiny elite, but a fast growing one. Those attaining junior college or above jumped from 1.4 percent to 3.6 percent of the population in the decade. The illiterate population also continued its long decline. In 1964 nearly a third of Chinese age 15 or over were illiterate or semi-literate, a number reduced to 15.9 percent in 1990. By 2000 this had fallen to 6.72 percent. Of course, rising educational attainment would be expected even if rates of schooling did not change in the decade, because younger educated cohorts are replacing older, less educated cohorts. An assessment of educational progress awaits the publication of cohort-specific measures or micro data.

### **Regional trends**

Provincial data can provide some insight into regional variation and change. Figure 1 provides a reference to China's provincial-level administrative units. China has added one such unit since the 1990 census; Chongqing Municipality was carved out of eastern Sichuan to form the 31<sup>st</sup> province.

Figure 1 here

The population of every province grew in the 1990s, but growth varied by region, apparently corresponding to natural increase and to migratory streams. The fastest growing province was Guangdong, a magnet for foreign capital and domestic migrants (see Table 4). Other provinces on the eastern seaboard from Shanghai to Hainan generally grew at above average rates. Growth was also strong in the west, particularly in Xinjiang and Tibet, which draw many Han migrants from the interior and where minority fertility is under looser constraints. Growth rates tended to be lower in impoverished areas of the interior that have experienced large outflows of economic migrants. In this category, Hunan, Sichuan, Chongqing and Henan are notable.

Table 4 here

Urbanization in the 1990s (as measured by the two incomparable definitions discussed above) was closely tied to economic growth. The urban percentage grew the most on the east coast, seen in Figure 1 as a dark crescent running from Jiangsu in the north to Hainan in the south, a region favored by investors from Taiwan, Hong Kong and abroad. Jiangsu and Fujian each went from 21 to 41 percent urban in the decade. The growth of the urban proportion was less but still substantial in a second tier of provinces in the middle reaches of the Yangzi River, including Anhui, Hubei and Hunan. The only rapidly urbanizing province in the interior was the newly created Chongqing Municipality. Every provincial-level unit experienced some urban growth in the decade.

The slowest urban growth occurred in the Northeast, already quite urbanized and saddled with many failing state owned enterprises.

## Data Quality

How good are the data? Given the environment in which the 2000 census operations took place, this is no routine question. China's social and political conditions once favored a high quality enumeration, but no longer. Two decades ago China had a relatively immobile population under the surveillance of a powerful and pervasive bureaucracy. There were, moreover, few disincentives to full and accurate reporting, for citizens or for officials. Under these circumstances China was able to produce census and survey data of astonishing accuracy. But two important phenomena arose, beginning in the 1980s, to alter this favorable situation. The first is a tide of rural to urban migrants, people who are difficult to track and who officials of cities would prefer not to have on their books. The second is the tightening of birth planning administration, which has given both families and local officials substantial disincentives to report out-of-plan births.

Results of a post-enumeration survey (PES) suggest that census data quality is good. A survey of 602 enumeration districts found a net undercount of 1.81 percent of the population (SSB 2001). Although this is considerably higher than the .06 percent undercount reported for the 1990 census, it is considered reasonable by international standards (Walfish 2001). However, a complete report of the PES is not yet available. It would be surprising if counts of births, deaths, migrants and children were as complete as

the overall population count. And, although there is as yet no basis on which to evaluate the PES, there are reasons to fear that the PES could itself fall substantially short of a complete enumeration. To understand why, it is necessary to consider the confluence of forces that affected the recent round of census work.

The high quality of previous Chinese censuses was due in considerable measure to the existence of the household registration system, and to the direct linkages between the registers and the census. The household registers include information about every household and constituent individual in an administrative area. The register should reflect every change in the composition of a household brought about by birth, death, marriage or migration, and it should reflect the sum of official knowledge about residents of the local administrative area.

The linkage between household registration and census work is direct and explicit. In the months immediately prior to a census the household registers are updated and verified in a process called “rectification” (*zhengdun*). By the time of the census the registers should reflect all information available to local officials about households in the enumeration area. The enumerator then draws upon the household register to construct a list of households in the enumeration district. This listing (the *hukou xingming dice*) includes the name and address of the household head, the number of registered household members, the number of births and deaths in the household in the past year, and the number of registered persons who are absent for less than and for more than six months. Thus at the time of the household interview, the enumerator already has in hand a set of

basic information that can be checked against that provided by the household informant.

Census procedures anticipate cross checking between sources, including “local cadres, activists, and other informed people” who are interviewed in a post-enumeration meeting.<sup>2</sup> Census procedures emphasize that the household interview is mandatory, but make it equally clear that the interview is not the sole source of information. It is thus theoretically possible for Chinese census data to be more accurate than the testimony of census respondents themselves.

But the household registers—and local population statistics in general—are not as good as they used to be, and this creates problems for the census. Because household registration work is now seriously biased by other policy imperatives, even the “rectified” registers probably distort the reality of local populations. Register errors accumulate between censuses. In the 2000 census, pre-census rectification revealed that Wenzhou had 50,000 deceased persons still on the registers, and Chongqing had 130,000. These errors were corrected, of course, but it is far easier to purge registers of the dead than it is to add the living. Children born outside the birth plan are often (despite central government regulations) excluded from the register, at least until substantial fines are paid. In Chongqing, rectification work uncovered 68,000 such cases,<sup>3</sup> but more could go undetected because both citizens and officials have reason to hide them. Parents conceal excess births to avoid fines, while officials keep them off the books because cadre work evaluations are based primarily on birth planning performance. To shield census work from these unfavorable incentives, census officials directed that all unregistered out-of-plan children be registered, that no fines be collected from parents of these children, and

that officials be amnestied for previous birth planning falsifications as long as they were truthfully reported in the census.<sup>4</sup> But the census is a passing phenomenon, while birth planning is a perennial problem. It would be only natural for local officials, fearing a “squaring of accounts after the autumn harvest,” to err on the side of discretion.

Other administrative considerations militate against the counting of urban migrants. The floating population is not easy to count in the best of circumstances, analogous in difficulty to counting undocumented aliens or the homeless in the United States. For this reason, census operations included unusual efforts to enumerate urban migrants, including an extensive pre-enumeration of sojourners sleeping outdoors and in public places. But local officials, who for various reasons wish to minimize the population of their administrative domain, may be less interested in a complete count. Low rates of population growth reflect success in population control, and small population totals boost per capita measures of income and productivity. Urban cadres in particular may be wary of moves by the central government to regularize the status of temporary migrants, as this could lead to claims for urban services such as schooling. Thus even as census workers valiantly sought the floating population by scouring construction sites and searching under bridges, local officials in some places subjected migrants to “census fees,” “security fees,” and “temporary residence fees” in an attempt to discourage them from being counted.<sup>5</sup>

The 2000 census was dogged by rumors of vast undercounts. Some provinces, such as Henan, Hunan, and Shaanxi, were said in newspaper accounts to have counted

millions fewer people than expected. These reports were probably exaggerated, and possibly based on misunderstandings of the way out-of-province migrants would be counted. Nonetheless, the potential for error in this census is considerable. Users should proceed with caution until the data have been carefully evaluated.

## Open Questions

The preliminary data release is also interesting for its omissions. Unlike the preliminary census publications that followed the 1982 and 1990 censuses, *Major Figures* for 2000 does not report on birth rates or the sex ratio of births (SRB). It is thus silent on two of the most pressing problems in Chinese demography. This is assuredly not incidental, and may well be indicative of yet other unseen problems.

There is great uncertainty about the level of China's fertility, reflecting declining confidence in the quality of birth reporting over the past decade. Although *Major Figures* did not report fertility for 2000, six provincial census bureaus did report crude birth rates (CBR). These are shown in Table 5, along with corresponding data from the 1995 1% Sample Census and from the SSB 1999 sample survey on population change, also a one percent population sample.

Table 5 here

The provincial CBRs suggest that fertility has declined since 1995, as each of the six provinces reports a lower CBR in 2000 than in 1995 or in 1999. This trend is difficult

to interpret because it involves both the changing age composition of the population as well as the underlying age-specific fertility rates. Another layer of complexity is added by the possibility that the reported rates have been adjusted by SSB demographers. Rates derived from fertility surveys are generally rejected as unrealistically low. The report of the 1995 1% Sample Census, for example, put the crude birth rate at 17.1 per 1000, but this figure is apparently the result of a substantial upward adjustment.<sup>6</sup> We do not yet know whether 2000 census fertility rates have been or will be adjusted. This information is obviously crucial for evaluating the census fertility data.

The sex ratio at birth (SRB) is also conspicuously absent from *Major Figures*. The SRB has risen monotonically since 1980, a trend that has ominous implications for female welfare and for mating, and bleak ramifications for poor families whose life plans depend crucially on the recruitment of a daughter-in-law. The 1982 census recorded (for 1981) an SRB of 108.5. The 1995 1% sample census found an SRB of 115.6, and the SSB announced an SRB of 117 for 1999. Sex ratios of the population age 0-4 have had a corresponding rise (see Table 6). The proximate causes of this trend must be some combination of underreporting of surviving females and excess female mortality, *in utero* or after birth. The 2000 census should provide valuable data for evaluating the trend, but users of the census must beware of possible data adjustments.

Table 6 here

The foregoing discussion leads to a final question: how will the census be published and distributed to users? Census data for 1990 were published in paper volumes, but no public use micro sample has yet been released. Demographers in China and abroad have had to rely on micro sample data sets purveyed through the back door (Mason and Lively 2001). China's top census officials clearly recognize that a modern census should be widely used, and provided in forms appropriate for computerized data analysis (Zhang 1998:11-12). But whether they are able to follow through on this vision remains to be seen.

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<sup>1</sup> The revised urban definition is described in SSB Document 1999 No. 114 (*Guanyu tongjishang huafen chengxiang de guiding (shixing)*) [Regulation concerning statistical differentiation of urban and rural (provisional)]. I am grateful to Kam Wing Chan for providing a copy.

<sup>2</sup> These procedures are described in the census enumerator handbook (Population Census Office 2000b). In the post-enumeration phase a range of documents may be consulted, as illustrated by this report from the New China News Agency:

In response to the problem of the non-reporting of the excess birth population, Henan demands that every place implement “five matches” of data from the 1998, 1999, and 2000 village (neighborhood) committee birth planning monthly reports, household register *zhengdun* materials, figures held by the village (neighborhood) committees, the *hukou xingming dice*, and the census enumeration form, comparing each with each and verifying no errors (Xinhuashe 2000.11.24).

<sup>3</sup> Chongqing figures are from Yangzi Wanbao, 5 November 2000 (“Chongqing renkou pucha xiayitiao—13 wan siwangren hukou wei chuxiao”). Wenzhou figures are from Xinmin Wanbao 11 November 2000 (“Wenzhou renkou pucha faxian wu wan duo siren ‘huozhe’”).

<sup>4</sup> These points were contained in a circular published by the State Council Fifth National Population Census Leading Small Group entitled “Guanyu zai diwuci quanguo renkou

pucha zhong zhen zuohao renkou pucha dengji gongzuo fangzhi manbao loubaode tongzhi” [Doing good enumeration work and preventing falsification and underreporting in the fifth national population census], reported in the *Yangcheng Wanbao*, 26 October 2000 (“Renkou pucha ziliao bude zuowei jisheng yiju”).

<sup>5</sup> Many news reports at the time of the census described and warned against such conduct.

One noted that:

...in some places the census is used as a pretext to levy illegitimate fees, so that the migrant population doesn't dare to be enumerated; there are also some places where the census is a pretext to do birth planning investigations and levy heavy fines on excess births, to the extent that even some households that have already paid fines and registered their excess child are again fined, so that excess birth households do not dare to make a truthful report. *Huashangbao* 10 November 2000 (“Shaanxi renkou pucha cunzai yanzhong wenti: ying dengji renkou shaole 200 wan”).

For other examples see *Renmin Ribao* 19 November 2000, dateline Changsha (“Hunan sheng renkou pucha gongzuo wending zhashi, moxie meiti ‘loudeng qianwanren’ de chuanwen bu shi”); *Xinhuashe* 22 November 2000, dateline Hefei (“Anhui yanjin jie renkou pucha luan shoufei luan fakuan”); *Sichuan Ribao* 17 November 2000 (“Sichuan jinji dian ling gedi jianjue zhizhi zai renkou pucha zhong luan shoufei”).

<sup>6</sup> The State Statistical Bureau uses an adjustment factor to adjust for undercount in register and survey data. According to Judith Banister (personal communication), the multipliers used rose from 1.072 in 1991 to 1.123 in 1995.

Table 1. China: Population and Growth Rates  
over Five Censuses, 1953-2000

Year	Population (thousands)	Absolute intercensal increase (thousands)	Average annual growth rate
1953	582,603	--	--
1964	694,582	111,979	1.60
1982	1,008,180	313,598	2.07
1990	1,133,709	125,529	1.47
2000	1,265,830	132,121	1.07

NOTES: Population totals include the People's Liberation Army but do not include Taiwan, Hong Kong, or Overseas Chinese. Population totals refer to July 1, except for 2000, which refers to November 1.

SOURCES: 1953 and 1964: State Statistical Bureau 1986a and 1986b, respectively. 1982, 1990, and 2000: Population Census Office 1985, 1993, 2001, respectively.

Table 2. China: Urban Population and Percent Urban, 1982-2000

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Year	Urban population (1000s)	Population percent urban
1982	206,309	20.55
1990	296,145	26.20
1995	353,396	28.58
1999	388,920	30.90
2000	455,940	36.09

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NOTE: Three definitions of urban population are used here, one for 1982, one for 1990-99, and one for 2000. See text for an explanation.

SOURCES: 1982, 1990, and 2000: Population Census Office 1985, 1993, 2001, respectively. 1995: National Population Sample Survey Office 1997. 1999: National Bureau of Statistics 2000.

Table 3. China: Percent of Population by Age Group,  
Rural and Urban, 1990 and 2000

Age	Total		Rural		Urban	
	1990	2000	1990	2000	1990	2000
0-14	27.7	22.9	29.6	25.5	25.9	18.4
15-64	66.7	70.1	64.8	67.2	68.6	75.3
65+	5.6	7.0	5.6	7.3	5.5	6.3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

SOURCES: Population Census Office 1993, 2001.

Table 4. Total Population and Percent Urban in 2000 Census,  
and Measures of Change 1990-2000: China Total and Provinces

Province	Population (10,000 persons)	Average annual rate of growth 1990-2000	Percent urban	Absolute increase of percent urban 1990-2000
China Total	126583	1.07	36.09	9.86
Beijing	1382	2.40	77.54	4.46
Tianjin	1001	1.27	71.99	3.34
Hebei	6744	0.96	26.08	7.00
Shanxi	3297	1.33	34.91	6.19
Inner Mongolia	2376	0.99	42.68	6.56
Liaoning	4238	0.69	54.24	3.39
Jilin	2728	0.98	49.68	7.03
Heilongjiang	3689	0.45	51.54	4.37
Shanghai	1674	2.22	88.31	22.08
Jiangsu	7438	1.01	41.49	20.25
Zhejiang	4677	1.18	48.67	15.86
Anhui	5986	0.62	27.81	9.91
Fujian	3471	1.41	41.57	20.21
Jiangxi	4140	0.91	27.67	7.27
Shandong	9079	0.71	38.00	10.66
Henan	9256	0.77	23.20	7.68
Hubei	6028	1.08	40.22	11.31
Hunan	6440	0.58	29.75	11.52
Guangdong	8642	3.13	55.00	18.23
Guangxi	4489	0.59	28.15	13.05
Hainan	787	1.78	40.11	16.06
Chongqing	3090	0.66	33.09	15.71
Sichuan	8329	0.59	26.69	5.40
Guizhou	3525	0.82	23.87	4.94
Yunnan	4288	1.44	26.69	8.64
Tibet	262	1.72	23.87	6.34
Shaanxi	3605	0.89	23.26	10.77
Gansu	2562	1.32	24.01	1.97
Qinghai	518	1.47	34.76	7.41
Ningxia	562	1.84	32.43	6.71
Xinjiang	1925	2.34	33.82	1.91

NOTE: The urban population was defined differently in 2000 than in 1999. See text.

SOURCE: Population Census Office 2001.

Table 5. Crude Birth Rate (Births per 1000) for China Total  
and Provinces Reporting 2000 Fertility, 1995-2000

	Year		
	1995	1999	2000
China Total	17.1	15.2	--
Beijing	7.9	6.5	6.0
Shanghai	5.8	5.4	5.5
Zhejiang	12.7	10.6	10.3
Guangxi	17.5	15.0	13.6
Chongqing	--	11.9	9.7
Guizhou	21.9	21.9	20.6

NOTES: 1995 refers to 1994.10.1 – 1995.9.30. 2000 refers to 1999.11.1 - 2000.10.31.


SOURCES: 1995: National Population Sample Survey Office 1997. 1999: National Bureau of Statistics 2000. 2000: Provincial communiqués, <http://www.p2000.gov.cn/p2000/index.htm/>.

Table 6. China: Sex Ratio of Births and Sex Ratio  
of the Population Age 0-4, 1953-1999

Year of Census or Survey	Sex ratio of births	Sex ratio of the population age 0-4
1953	--	107.0
1964	--	105.7
1982	108.5	107.1
1990	111.4	110.2
1995	115.6	118.4
1999	117	119.5

NOTE: 1982 census SRB refers to births in 1981; 1990 census SRB refers to births in 1989.1.1 – 1990.6.30; 1995 sample census SRB refers to births in 1994.10.1 – 1995.9.30. The 1999 SRB refers to births in 1998.10.1 – 1999.9.30. The latter was given as 117 without a decimal point.

SOURCES: 1953 and 1964: State Statistical Bureau 1986a and 1986b, respectively. 1982 and 1990: Population Census Office 1985 and 1993, respectively. 1995: National Population Sample Survey Office 1997. 1999: National Bureau of Statistics 2000 (for sex ratio of population) and (for sex ratio of births) March 28, 2001 news conference of National Bureau of Statistics Director Zhu Zhixin. The latter is presumably from the SSB Population Change Survey of 1999.



**Figure 1. Absolute Growth of Percent Urban by Province: China 1990-2000**

SOURCES: Basemap is from the National Fundamental Geographic Information System (NFGIS) of China, copyright State Bureau of Surveying and Mapping. Theme data are from Table 4.