



**Do Transnational Organizations**

**Promote Civil and Political Liberties?**

*Cross-National Evidence from Southeast Asia, 1978-2002*

**SARA R. CURRAN AND FREDERICK F. WHERRY**

**DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, PRINCETON, NJ 08544**

**[CURRAN@PRINCETON.EDU](mailto:CURRAN@PRINCETON.EDU) OR [FFWHERRY@PRINCETON.EDU](mailto:FFWHERRY@PRINCETON.EDU)**

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## **ABSTRACT**

Using both qualitative and quantitative evidence, we ask whether transnational organizations promote civil and political liberties in Southeast Asia from 1978 to 2002. Profiting from world-polity, world-systems, and global city theorists, we argue that transnational organizations function as carriers of world-culture. Two important elements of world-culture are civil and political liberties. Therefore, where there is a large concentration of world-culture carriers, there will also be more widespread “infections” of civil and political liberty. Examining cross-national, longitudinal evidence from Asia and Southeast Asia from 1978-2002, the paper examines why countries such as the Philippines and Thailand experienced such dramatic increases in political and civil liberty when they did. The analysis demonstrates that economic growth is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for social change in Southeast Asia, though it is a sufficient condition for increasing civil and political liberties in Asia. In Southeast Asia, instead, dramatic increases in economic development accompanied by increases in the number of transnational organizations led to greater civil and political liberties. We conclude by mapping the concentration of transnational organizations in global cities, discussing the dialectic between global cities and nation-states for promoting change, and identifying fruitful areas for future research. (Words: 199)

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## INTRODUCTION

Recent work on the world-polity emphasizes how networks of transnational organizations carry world culture (Beckfield 2003; Meyer et al. 1997; Boli and Thomas 1997). Nation-states adopt the world culture norms and civil liberties increase (Meyer et al. 1997). By contrast, world-systems accounts of social change emphasize conflict, power interests, and global hierarchies but recognize the potential for transnational organizations to carry world-culture in the service of global capitalism (Chase-Dunn 1998). A number of ethnographic studies have emphasized how networks of transnational organizations promote social change (Akami 2002; Parmar 2002; Stone 2002). Because these descriptive analyses of social change might be confounded, e.g. countries with more transnational organization offices or ties may be more open societies and more willing to enact civil and political liberties, the effect of transnational organizations upon political and civil liberties cannot be discerned without longitudinal, cross-national evidence.

This paper offers evidence on the relationship between transnational organizations, political, and civil liberties in Southeast Asia between 1978 and 2002. Because the mechanisms for social change are likely to vary from one region to another, world-trends are not analyzed (Cf. Centeno and López-Alves 2001), yet the sample is extended to include the Asia region. The dramatic economic changes that have occurred in Southeast Asia have been documented (e.g., Evans 1995; Amsden 1989), as well as compared and contrasted with East Asia and Latin America. However, the sources of social and political change in the region are less well studied.

We extend world-polity analyses by exploring how growing numbers of transnational organizations can affect an increase in political and civil liberties over a twenty year period, net of other conditions such as economic growth, world system position, and urban concentration. Our analysis builds on the models described by Meyer et al. (1997) and Boli and Thomas (1997) to evaluate empirically their hypotheses. The empirical evaluation is combined with a two-case comparison of the Philippines and Thailand. The case studies and several illustrative examples of how transnational organizations affect change “on the ground” (from the authors’ experiences), as well as the empirical results suggest that world culture models might be modified by explicitly theorizing how the location, movement, and spread of transnational ties affect the distribution of power between the nation-state and the global city. The results suggest that global cities can effectively challenge the national status quo, moving the nation-state towards increasing civil and political liberties. In Southeast Asia these historic moments are most highly correlated with a concentration of transnational ties in particular cities in the region. As the data show, the concentration of transnational organizations is not static, and their movement creates a political and social dynamic between the city and the nation-state. The concluding discussion builds on Sassen (2001) and Chase-Dunn’s (1998) ideas about the role of the global city relative to the political authority of the nation-state.

Three theoretical perspectives inform our research. On the one hand, the world-polity theorists have documented the structure of the world-polity (Beckfield 2003; Boli & Thomas 1997). Transnational organizations are the nodes of a network that has grown in size and volume, especially since the early 1970s (Boli & Thomas 1997). These

transnational organizations legitimize groups within the population pursuing greater civil liberties (Meyer et al. 1997). On the other hand, the world-systems theorists offer competing explanations for the patterns of civil liberties and suggest that political liberties are more limited in variation; they suggest that transnational organizations are established as coordinating committees for global capitalism. The promotion of civil liberties is an emergent goal (Chase-Dunn 1998) and the promotion of political liberties is sometimes a hindrance to global capitalism. Instead, the most reliable predictor of civil liberties is world-system position: as countries leave the periphery and approach the core, they become more likely to promote civil liberties (Bollen 1985). Finally, the global cities theorists have documented the importance of global cities as coordinators of financial capital and how these cities elude the authority of the nation-state (Sassen [1991] 2001; Wherry & Curran 2000). However, the concentration of “cultural capital” in these cities and its consequences has been given scant attention.

We extend those analyses by measuring the effect of transnational organizations on political and civil liberties between 1978 and 2002. Two measures of civil and political liberties, respectively, are employed. The paper also accounts for possibly confounding variables, such as GDP per capita, foreign direct investment and urbanization. The quantitative analysis is enhanced by two illustrative cases of social change in Thailand and the Philippines, two of the longest-standing democracies in Southeast Asia, in order to understand the processes of social change. Our findings support both the world-polity and the world-systems predictions that growing numbers of transnational organizations effectively increase political and civil liberties. The findings also show how world-system position acts on nation-states in tandem with transnational

organizations. Because of the paucity of data on city locations of transnational organizations by year, our assessment of global cities as strategic sites for cultural and political capital is proposed with some descriptive evidence and a call for more research on the role of cities as catalysts and incubators of social change within nation-states.

### **WORLD-POLITY AND WORLD CULTURE**

According to the world-polity perspective, there are world-culture norms, including the individual's rights to civil liberty and political freedom. Nation-states have little choice but to enact these norms, at least on paper. At times these norms are enacted through the establishment of institutions enhancing and protecting these rights. Enactment is essential if the country wants to participate in the world economy and the globalized culture of exchange. Defiance of world-polity values risks abrogation and censure by the world-polity and possible internal strife among the citizenry (Meyer et al. 1997). For example, citizens can defy the laws of the nation-state in their daily practices (Cf. gay rights activists, etc). These acts of resistance are enabled through the world polity institutions and norms that certify such actions as legitimate (Ibid.).

Transnational organizations and the norms they carry is the subject of recent scholarship (Beckfield 2003; Boli & Thomas 1997; Meyer et al. 1997) as a result of innovative efforts to make available extant data collected by the Union of International Associations. The structure of the world-polity has been sketched from 1875 to 1973. From a low of 200 organizations at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, international non-governmental organizations numbered almost 4,000 in 1980 (Boli & Thomas 1997). These organizations are neither state-sponsored rule makers nor democratically elected

bodies, yet Boli and Thomas argue that they have integrated the world into a singular polity over the last hundred years (Boli & Thomas 1997: 172). Countries with regional headquarters of international nongovernmental or international governmental organizations were significantly more highly correlated with having greater citizenship rights specified in their national constitutions (Boli & Thomas 1997: 178). We extend Boli and Thomas' (1997) claim about the importance of transnational organizations by estimating a regression model on twenty years of data from countries in Southeast Asia.

The world-polity theorists also offer more circumstantial evidence for how transnational organizations affect political and civil liberties. These theorists have identified the types of norms circulating through transnational organizations:

[Transnational organizations] are loci of transnational contextual knowledge....

[T]hey supply the purposes and meaning of action; they provide models for global organizing, forms of discourse and communication, and avenues for influencing states and other actors. [Boli & Thomas 1997: 180]

These world-culture norms offer the denizens of nation-states other ways of organizing their domestic and international political affairs. Isomorphism among national institutions increases as more nation-states come under the sway of world-culture norms (Meyer et al. 1997; Meyer & Hannan 1979). Transnational organizations are, by their account, the loci for the world-polity's cultural capital.

Based on our combined working experiences in Bangkok, Thailand and Manila, Philippines, we find considerable support, at least anecdotally, for our claim that transnational organizations influence the policy scripts of nation-states (Cf. Steinmetz 1998). However, we observe that the road to a universal norm of political and civil

liberties that is also universally institutionalized is much more bumpy and circuitous. Based on field experiences, we suggest that an important aspect of any account of how world-polity ties affect social and political change must include a characterization of the global city and its citizenry in relation to the nation-state, the national polity, and international ties to other global cities or nation-states. Just as the control posts of economic capital are concentrated in select global cities (Sassen 1991, 2000), we suggest that the ideological control posts of global capitalism occupy similar sites. And at particular moments in history, the concentration of transnational organizations within global cities effects social and political change. To date, world-polity theorists have not identified the city locations of transnational organizations as important for the enactment of world-culture norms. Yet, the world-system and global cities theorists demonstrate why cities are important for affecting social and economic change.

It is likely that cities are also a locale for explaining how transnational organizations might be important for the circulation and enactment of world-culture norms. In this paper we extend world-polity studies by bringing global cities into focus. The paper also extends world-polity studies by integrating world-system perspective so that power, competing interests and conflict can be included in a model that often appears to predict or explain an ahistorical cultural consensus (DiMaggio & Powell 1983).

### **WORLD-SYSTEM POSITION**

World-systems theorists also recognize the role of transnational organizations (TNOs) for promoting world-culture norms. As countries move from the periphery towards the core, they are more likely to become political democracies (Bollen 1983). However, world-

culture is not the cause of these transformations but rather a byproduct of power struggles in the world polity. Those with the most to gain from the adoption of liberties are the ones to put into motion the policy scripts that yield expansive liberties. Transnational organizations are in the service of global capitalism and act as the coordinating committee for the world capitalist class (Chase-Dunn 1998). This proposition has found support outside of the world-systems entourage. Bourdieu (2001) warns that the world-polity strengthens its networks and homogenizes the norms shared by nation-states in order to facilitate capitalist domination.

The fact that transnational organizations have supported civil liberties that are sometimes at odds with unfettered markets has led some world polity theorists to denounce the hard-boiled interest approach of the world-system theorists. However, before denouncing the role of power and interests, this paper takes heed to Merton's discussion of purposive action: some goals are emergent and differ from the original intentions of their instigators (Merton 1957).

Moreover, world-culture norms are not always binding. When nation-states see it in their interest to violate norms codified in the United Nations Charters, they do so. The reliance of the world-polity theorists on transnational organizations to sketch the structure of the polity reflects their growing recognition that the values and rules of world-culture must be disseminated and enforced by institutions. It could be, as world systems theorists would argue, that the power and interests of these institutions matter more than the values they circulate. Moreover, world systems theorists would argue that these institutions exist because it is in the material interest of the interstate system to create them (Chase-Dunn 1998: 104). Disentangling material interest effects from world-polity culture

effects in this line of reasoning may be difficult, especially if they are highly correlated. By selecting a longitudinal panel study of Southeast Asian countries we attempt to maximize variation in world-system position and concentration of world-polity culture in order to distinguish the differences in effects.

Chase-Dunn (1998: 319) also suggests that cities drive social change within the world systems but concedes that the data on cities are scarce. The world city system is a nested hierarchy within the world system; its detection and measurement might shed light on economic and social development. World-systems theorists have said little about cities because of the scarcity of data, not because cities are theoretically irrelevant. This paper explores how global cities harbor transnational organizations and how world-culture norms become epidemics in these harbors. Faced with data limitations, this paper uses cross-sectional data and “on the ground” qualitative observances to examine the role of cities as harbors for transnational organizations. Time series data are not readily available with city-level data. Most analyses are conducted at the level of the nation-state, but the cross-section shows that transnational organizations are presently concentrated in global cities and are likely to have been so for a long time.

#### **GLOBAL CITY CONCENTRATIONS OF WORLD CULTURE**

Sassen (1986: 85) defines global cities as those sites that serve a coordinating role for global economic activity *while also* serving as “sites for the production of a large array of inputs and ‘organizational commodities’ necessary for global control and coordination.” Later Sassen ([1991] 2001) labels New York, London, and Tokyo as global cities. By extension Sassen and Portes (1993) write of second-rank global cities, such as Miami,

that operate on a regional scale. The global city model marks a specific socio-spatial historical phase and emphasizes “the ‘production’ of the global economic system. It is not simply a matter of global coordination but one of the production of global control capacities” (Sassen 2001: 349).

The global networks that bind global cities share their concentration of financial capital and occupy distinct command posts for coordinating economic activities across the globe. The institutions, management and workings of these cities are not limited to the nation-state-- the functions of multinational companies headquartered within these global cities reaches well beyond the jurisdiction of the nation-state to other cities and nations. Hence, the material and political interests of these cities are not national, but international and may, at times, be at odds with those of the nation-state within which they are spatially located. These analyses of linked cities focus on their economic rather than cultural, political, and ideological functions within the international system. However, economic capital is just one of several types of capital. Indeed, a transnational field composed of political and cultural capital also links global cities.

The global city is “the *culmination of a process of concentration* of different *species of capital*: capital of physical force or instruments of coercion..., economic capital, cultural capital..., and symbolic capital” (Bourdieu 1999: 57). Our description of the global city uses Pierre Bourdieu’s formulation of the state. We substitute “the global city” for “the state” in order to emphasize the historical role of cities. Cities have long acted as sites for the accumulation of capital and coercion (Tilly 1990). They continue to serve this function. By example, we focus on two regional cities in Southeast Asia, Bangkok and Manila to argue that more attention could be paid by world-polity and

world-systems theorists to the role of regional global cities as catalysts for social change within nation-states and internationally. We map the concentration of cultural power across countries and within countries across cities to demonstrate how the centers of power have remained cloaked.

### **THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF WAR AND PLUNDER**

In order to discover these strategic centers of accumulation for world-culture, this paper discerns the “conscious *motivations* for social behavior... [from] its *objective consequences*” (Merton 1957: 60). Dominant countries such as the United States have financed transnational organizations such as the United Nations and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank). Motivating the United States was the desire to expand her markets, to obtain cheap materials and labor, and to maintain a stable rules structure, stimulating commerce in the international system. As unlikely as it might seem, these manifest motivations have given way to their latent function: the generation of world-culture norms.

The history of transnational organizations makes these two points clear: 1) The goal of establishing transnational organizations in Southeast Asia as not to promote world-culture norms but was an attempt by dominant groups to consolidate their power. And 2) the Philippines and Thailand did not become centers for transnational organizations because they were already more sympathetic to democratic values but rather because they fit the geopolitical concerns of the core countries. An East Asian capitalist dictatorship was much better than a communist republic, no matter how

egalitarian. Ironically, transnational organizations promoting peace were conceivable just after major wars were fought.

The Second World War's end led to the establishment of two international bodies: the Breton Woods Institutions (the World Bank and International Monetary Fund) would promote the rebuilding of a war-torn Europe and ensure stability within the international economic system; the United Nations would promote international peace and security and encourage cooperation in social, economic, and cultural affairs.

Southeast Asia experienced two more military ruptures and two more historical opportunities for the emergence of multilateral coordinating bodies: the Vietnam and the Indo-Chinese Wars. The Vietnamese War was a war against communism. Ideology emerged as the major threat to the international economic system. In 1961 President Kennedy responded to that threat by sending the first American troops to Vietnam. Cambodia and Laos found themselves bombed by the Americans in response to their ideological contagion. America's friends in the region found themselves inundated with development assistance and anti-communist ideology. Regional development organizations emerged as part of the new ideological infrastructure to rebuild Southeast Asia. Where the United States established a strong military presence, development aid and transnational organizations followed.

Notably, two other regional bodies also emerged in the 60s. The Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO) was founded in 1965 and is headquartered in Bangkok. It was founded after a meeting of the Ministers of Education from Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Republic of (South) Vietnam as well as the chairperson of UNESCO National Commission (Philippines) and the Special Adviser

to the President of the United States. Likewise, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) also has a Bangkok connection. Although ASEAN has its headquarters in Jakarta, it was established in 1967 after a meeting in Bangkok by representatives from its five founding member countries. ASEAN's objective is to "accelerate economic growth, social progress, and cultural development in the region" ([www.asean.org](http://www.asean.org), 9 January 2003). Either the Philippines or Bangkok generally served as the sites for regional coordination.

## **TWO ILLUSTRATIVE CASES**

The history of freedom and transnational organizations in the Philippines and Thailand are illustrative of the manifest and latent functions that transnational organizations serve. Together these two countries reflect very similar trends towards increasing freedom. They both entered the modern era, post World War Two, with the establishment of strong ties to the United States, which grew stronger throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Their economies and populations were a similar size following the war and both endured brief Japanese occupations during the war. However, they were also quite different and remain different. One is an island nation with many ethnic groups and more than 100 languages and the other is based in mainland Southeast Asia with few ethnic minorities and few distinct language groups. The economies of each have grown at very different rates with Thailand's reaching double-digit growth during much of two decades since the war and the Philippine economy struggling. Democracy movements have been sporadic in each country, but at two different and distinct points in time each moved toward participatory democracy and the relinquishment of military influence in the affairs of

political and civil society with little subsequent reversal in these trends. These junctures both occurred after city-based, middle-class, religious and student coalitions joined forces to oust longstanding governments. The Philippines and Thailand have now become the longest persisting democracies in Asia (Case 2001). Why have these two countries achieved this status and why did they achieve this status when they did?

In this section we briefly describe the political and economic contexts of each country since the 1950s and what we know of the moments in history that led to significant shifts in political and civil liberties. After doing so, we propose an explanation for the timing and form of these particular junctures in each country and then test our proposition with a multivariate analysis of a longitudinal, cross-national data file.

### *The Philippines*

In the Philippines, the Second World War gave rise to the Huk rebels, former guerilla warriors who had resisted the brief Japanese occupation of the archipelago. Mostly rural tenant farmers, the Huk were no communists. They wanted better working conditions and to be treated with respect by the landowners. And after centuries of domination by the Spaniards and then the Americans, they were unwilling to accept a third occupying force without a fight. And fight they did.

The Filipino government squelched the brief rebellion in 1953 with the assistance of the U.S. government. As the US strengthened the hand of the Filipino military to obliterate potentially “red” elements in the population, a military and economic elite crystallized. At first, few within the country dared contend with such a well resourced, coercive apparatus. Except for sporadic student movements in the late 1960s and early

1970s, there were few challenges to the status quo. There is no evidence that the masses were clamoring for freedom. Table 1 briefly summarizes political change during the last fifty years of the twentieth century (Dolan 2003; Krinks 2002; Wurfel 1988).

-- Table 1 About Here --

The most recent movement of the Philippines toward democracy has its roots in the 1965 election of Ferdinand Marcos. Marcos came to power democratically but quickly moved to consolidate his power. In his first term Marcos initiated many expensive and high profile public works projects, garnering support from both the general public and his friends who profited from lucrative, state-financed contracts. It was the beginning of his second presidential term that the winds of change began to blow.

By the time Marcos won the dubious 1969 elections, government corruption was growing, economic growth slowing, urban crime and violence peaking, conflicts between Muslims and Christians, mounting; and a communist insurgency as well as a Muslim separatist movement were spreading. Martial law was declared in 1972, and by the early 1980s, the Filipino economy had shrank as neighboring economies took-off.

The 1983 assassination of opposition leader, Benigno Aquino, set fire to a diverse opposition movement that had slowly coalesced against Marcos. The opposition became known as the “People’s Power” movement, included rural farmers, but largely took place in the urbanized portions of the country. How did this coalition coalesce, and what role did transnational organizations play?

First, the transnational ties of the church were important for generating elements of the opposition. Liberation theology traveled along transnational ties through church missions, infecting their parishioners with a sense that corrupt leaders such as Marcos no longer had a *legitimate* right to rule. Second, Marcos' coercive apparatus, the military, had been contaminated with the ideals of bureaucratic professionalism. As the US and some European countries trained army officers for the purposes of eliminating the communist insurgency and stabilizing the region, the trainings necessarily inculcated the officers with the world-culture values of bureaucratic professionalism. A highly trained cadre of army officers now saw their advancement as dependent on well-financed international exchange programs rather than on their financially weak and moral corrupt regime. Finally, the business elite could look at the success of their neighbors to verify that their potential financial gains had been forgone and that a more stable set of rules might facilitate more foreign direct investment. With God, the people and the military disaffected, Marcos's attempt to claim victory in the 1986 election lacked support. Through non-violent means the People's Power movement ousted him.

In his place came Corazon Aquino in 1986. Under her administration, democratic processes were revitalized and civil liberties propagated. Since 1986 democratic processes and civil liberties have persisted. Social movements still hold sway over government excesses. Despite numerous coup attempts and economic volatility, civil society has remained vigilant. When President Estrada tried to suspend impeachment hearings against him (He was being charged with corruption.), mass demonstrations forced him to resign. Moreover, the transition to Arroyo's administration was fairly smooth, and regular elections are scheduled for 2004.

The tradition of democracy and the vigilance that supports it have emerged in the communications between elements of civil society and elements of the transnational community. As bureaucratic institutions, transnational organizations employed many urban Filipinos and introduced them to the world-polity ideals of social rights and obligations. The work culture and job training provided by transnational organizations created a local constituency that expected and demanded similar rights for their nation-state as they were granted in their organizations. Numerous indigenous non-governmental organizations emerged. Some mimicked the organizational templates of the transnational organizations; others defined themselves in opposition to these outside influences; and still others remained close to their local organizing traditions, while selectively borrowing from transnational models. Although these extra-organizational outcomes were not intended by the first set of transnational organizations to enter the Philippines, they were nonetheless the objective outcomes of that entry.

Figures 1 and 2 show the trends in both number and concentration of transnational organizations in Southeast Asian countries from 1980 to 2002. As others have shown the number of transnational organizations<sup>1</sup> has grown dramatically over the last two decades. Quite clearly the Philippines was the dominant center for secretariat location, especially during the 1980s. The Philippines reached its dominance as the focal point for the most transnational organizations across Southeast Asia with 30 percent of secretariats located there. From that point onward its dominance diminished as Thailand and Singapore dramatically increased the number of transnational organizations located in their

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<sup>1</sup> We measure transnational organizations that fall into the following types defined by the *Union of International Associations*: federations of international organizations (Type A); universal membership organizations (Type B); intercontinental membership organizations (Type C); limited or regionally-defined membership organizations (Type D); and organizations having a special form, including foundations or funds (Type F).

countries. By the end of the 1990s Thailand had become the country with the most transnational organization secretariats in Southeast Asia.

-- Figures 1 and 2 About Here --

Initially these transnational organizations were sited in one country but not another because the United States was warring against communism. Thailand and Philippines did not stand out for their democratic traditions in the 50s and 60s, but they did stand out as strategic sites for war. Therefore, any analysis of the world-polity must keep world-system conflict on the same footing as world-system culture.

### *Thailand*

World-system conflict ran parallel to national power struggles. In 1950 Bhumibol Adulyadej ascended the throne as the ninth regent of the Chakri dynasty (King Rama IX), following considerable turmoil. Since the 1932 coup and the establishment of the constitutional monarch, the king skillfully negotiated the monarchy's relationship to the military, the elite, and the masses (See Table 1).

-- Table 1 About Here --

King Rama IX is the longest reigning monarch in Thai history and has presided over seven different constitutions, numerous governments, and eight successful and unsuccessful military coups. Table 2 summarizes the dramatic changes in government since 1950.

-- Table 2 About Here --

Many of these dramatic changes in government occurred as the interests of the merchant elite, the monarchy, and the military sometimes converged, sometimes conflicted. In 1992 the interests of the masses became manifest in the May 1992 protests. These protests culminated in the deaths of at least 50 protesters and the dramatic display, televised around the world, of the two instigators, representative of military and civilian elites, groveling on their knees in apologize to the King. The aftermath of May 1992 yielded the longest period of freely-elected civilian governments in Thailand as well as a new constitution (ratified in 1997) with the most civil and political liberties the country has ever known. How did this dramatic shift toward democracy happen and why did it happen when it did?

One explanation might be that economic growth gave rise to an emerging middle class and business elite that depended upon economic stability and civil rights. Economic growth in Thailand was indeed dramatic, preceding the May 1992 protests. Between 1985 and 1995 the Thai economy grew by 10% per year (Bello, Cunningham, and Poh 1998; Warr and Nidhiprabha 1986). However, the growth that occurred in Thailand was fueled by the nation-state's emphasis on low wage, low skill manufacturing. Production technologies were not upgraded, and the economic infrastructure did not expand (Bello et al. 1998; Phongpaichit and Baker 1998). The state spent little on education, and the country remained predominantly rural (Muscat 1994; Thailand Development Research

Institute). Furthermore, as the gross national production grew so too did income inequality (Phongpaichit and Baker 1998).

Dramatic economic growth preceded a student-based movement in the 1970s that precipitated a shortly-lived flirtation with civilian government. During the mid- to late 1960s and early 1970s the Thai economy grew on average 8% per year. However, this growth, the student protests, and the new civilian government did not yield a persisting democratic government.

Improved economic conditions were necessary but not sufficient conditions for the emergence and persistence of democracy in Thailand. The ideological infrastructure also had to be in place. By 1988 Thailand had the fastest growing establishment rate of transnational organizations. Her capacity to absorb and disseminate world-culture values was strong. Thailand shared with the Philippines the distinction of ranking first in the number of secretariats among Southeast Asian countries (Figures 1 and 2). By 1997 Thailand had the largest number and proportion of secretariats in the region. The coincidence of the dramatic and growing concentration of transnational organizations with dramatic changes in political outcomes cannot be ignored. Similar to the Philippines in the 1980s, transnational organizations in Thailand created a cultural and civic milieu supporting the expansion and expression of political and civil liberties.

### ***Pathways of Influence: Some Examples***

What were the transnational organizations doing to promote change? Several anecdotes highlight the three functions carried out by transnational organizations: the management

of global capital, the creation of alternative voice mechanisms, and the provision of legitimacy for the discontent.

Case 1: Management of Global Capital. Development organizations have discovered that their interlocutors use a different set of signifiers and follow a different code of behavior. “Yes” does not always mean “yes,” depending, instead, on the context. Those best prepared to understand these signs and to respond appropriately are those who share such understandings. One World Bank official in the Bangkok Office remarked that their office offers assistance to a number of their neighboring countries whose ministries of finance are preparing loan applications. The Thai staff understood how to interact with the Cambodians and the Lao, for example, much better than any consultant sent from Washington, DC. The Bangkok office thereby brings neighboring bank operations into adherence with the expectations of the head office in Washington. Pressure is applied in culturally appropriate ways; consent is obtained; the relevant actors become responsive; and money moves into Central Banks (Author observations 1999, 2001).

Case 2: Alternative Voice Mechanisms. The Asia Foundation supported forums and trainings for the new 1997 Thai Constitution. As a nongovernmental organization, the Asia Foundation focused on increasing the amount of information that citizens had about how new, democratic constitutions have been developed across the globe. They also promoted the democratic practice of forums and town hall meetings. With an office in Bangkok but with ties to cities

across Asia and the United States, the Asia Foundation can mobilize political and cultural capital that would otherwise remain dormant (Author observations 1997).

Case 3: Legitimacy for the Discontent. In 1982 the World Bank agreed to a large loan disbursement to the Philippines for agricultural and forest resource development. The loan required that confiscated lands be returned and redistributed to peasant farmers. Ironically, these loan conditions reinforced the legitimacy of local claims made by both former Huk rebels and their contemporaries. Furthermore, the Bank required that young, mid-level government officials in the Ministries of Agriculture and Natural Resources be trained in the local empowerment. As elements of world-culture values, local empowerment principles were being spread by the same organization promoting the nearly unfettered flow of financial capital. The training programs facilitated relationships between urban-based bureaucrats and the leaders of local communities. These bureaucrats carried their observations and sympathies back to the city and share these values with family and friends. (Author observations 1983).

These case studies highlight the relevant aspects of social change and illustrate how transnational organizations provide voice mechanisms and legitimacy to citizens promoting social change. The cases also highlight how transnational organizations continue to function as managers of global capital. The cases do not assess the magnitude of how significant transnational organizations are for political and civil

liberties. Furthermore, the anecdotes are not intended to portray transnational organizations as non-economic, benevolent guardians of the world-polity. Instead, these anecdotes capture the types of interactions that occur where transnational organizations enter local life. The motivations of the transnational organizations do not always square with the objective consequences of their actions. As bureaucratic actors, their actions are sometimes contradictory and the consequences thereof unanticipated.

A danger of interpretation looms. The immediacy of the anecdotes might lead the researcher to assume that transnational organizations are crisscrossing the entire globe as political and civil liberties blossom in their wake. Testing whether transnational organizations have a significant effect on political and civil liberties requires a more systematic approach.

#### **EXPLAINING THE EMERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE OF DEMOCRACY IN THE PHILIPPINES AND THAILAND: TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS CARRIERS OF WORLD-CULTURE**

Building on the brief comparisons of the Philippines and Thailand, the paper tests whether the growth and concentration of transnational civic organizations predicts the emergence and persistence of civil as well as political liberties. Using a longitudinal, cross-national data file, the paper profits from measures of transnational organizations not previously available to researchers. Measures of political and civil liberties not usually used by sociologists but rather by political scientists are also employed.

This section begins with a descriptive account of political and civil liberties, as well as trends in economic growth and urbanization in Southeast Asia over two decades, 1980-2000. Bivariate comparisons will demonstrate the independence of transnational organizations from patterns of economic growth in the region. Finally, several

multivariate models will ascertain the importance of world-polity hypotheses relative to alternative explanations.

### ***POLITICAL AND CIVIL LIBERTIES***

The measures of political and civil liberties have been developed and collected by Freedom House.<sup>2</sup> Since 1978, Freedom House has published *Freedom in the World*, an annual comparative assessment of the state of political rights and civil liberties in 192 countries and 18 related and disputed territories. The survey uses a multi-source approach to determine scores for political and civil liberties, including regional experts, consultants, human rights specialists, journalists, and political figures (of all persuasions) familiar with conditions in their respective countries. In addition, the survey uses information from published materials, ranging from the reports of other human rights organizations to regional newspapers and journals.

Political liberties are measured on a seven-point scale with a score of one representing full political liberties and seven, the absence of political liberties. Countries are scored on ten items that fall under three categories: fair electoral process, political pluralism and freedom of participation, and openness of government functions (relative freedom from corruption and independence from foreign and military influences). Civil liberties are also measured on a seven-point scale with a score of one representing full civil liberties and seven, the absence of civil liberties. Countries are scored along eleven items on four topics: freedom of expression and religious beliefs, freedom of association and the right to assemble in public places, the rule of law and human rights, and personal

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<sup>2</sup> More information about the measures are available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/index.htm>

autonomy and respect for property rights (more information is available from:

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/index.html>).

The Freedom House measures have been used by a number of political scientists (Bollen 1993; Burkhart and Lewis-Bark 1994; Huntington 1984; Kegley and Herman 1994). Despite some concerns with heteroskedasticity the measures have been found to be reliable and valid indicators of democracy and to accurately reflect shifts in political and civil liberties over time (Bollen 1993; Burkhart and Lewis-Bark 1994). Figures 3 and 4 show the trends in political and civil liberties from 1980 to 2001 in the Southeast Asian countries analyzed in this study. There is variability across countries and across time, although some countries show more variability across time than do others. The mean score over the time period is 5.04 for political liberties and 4.81 for civil liberties. On average both Thailand and the Philippines have the lowest mean scores for the entire period, but both countries show significant variation over time.

-- Figures 3 and 4 About Here --

The near miraculous transformations of Thailand and the Philippines were mirrored by increasing civil liberties in South Korea and Indonesia. Notably, Malaysia saw a reduction in civil liberties, and the dominant state of Singapore was largely unchanged. The political changes in Southeast Asia prompted President Ronald Reagan to declare, “The winds of freedom are blowing in Asia” (cited in Johnson and Um 1986: 10). What caused these changes to sweep across the region and why in some countries but not others?

### *TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS*

The *Yearbook of International Organizations* published by the Union of International Associations provides information on international secretariats by country. These secretariats operate in at least three countries and perform a variety of functions.

Although the data for raw data are not available for public use, the Union of International Associations prepared a derivative country-year file and city-year file for a select set of secretariats for countries in Asia between 1982 and 2002.

The secretariats counted in the data files include five types: 1) federations of international organizations (Type A); 2) universal membership organizations (Type B); 3) intercontinental membership organizations (Type C); 4) limited or regionally-defined membership organizations (Type D); and 5) organizations having a special form, including foundations or funds (Type F). Table 3 gives examples of these various types of secretariats found in Thailand in 2000.

-- Table 3 About Here --

The *Yearbook* data file used in our analysis contains data from all the years between 1980 and 2002 (Cf. Beckfield 2003) and extends the work of Boli and Thomas (1997) whose analysis ends in 1973. The descriptive trends are available in Figures 1 and 2. On average countries have about 35 secretariats over the time period, but some, like the Philippines and Thailand, have almost twice as many for much of the period and

others, like Vietnam and Burma, have very few. But in all cases the rate of growth of transnational organizations is dramatic (Figure 1), particularly in Thailand and Singapore.

### ***WORLD-SYSTEM POSITION AND GLOBAL CITY STATUS***

The World Bank's cross-national time-series provides data on world-system position (World Bank 2002). Two measures of world system position are employed. Foreign direct investment (FDI) as a percentage of GDP gives a crude estimate of how tightly the national economy is integrated into the world-system. In addition to FDI, the World Bank also provides information on GDP per capita, included in this analysis as a control variable. GDP provides a measure of national economic growth and size.

The test for how global cities affect political and civil liberties is indirect. This paper emphasizes those global cities that also concentrate cultural and political capital. Transnational organizations embody such capital, but they are not necessarily located in global cities. The paper includes a measure of the proportion of the population living in urban areas because urban dwellers are more likely to have been exposed to world-polity values. Furthermore, urban areas have long been hypothesized as the sites for political and social change.

A second world-system variable is foreign direct investment as a the proportion of GDP. Singapore shows the greatest linkage to the world economy with dramatically high rates at several points over the twenty-year period. Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia show recent and dramatic increases, but this is most likely due to high initial rates of investments relative to the size of their economies. Thailand and the Philippines show some of the lowest rates.

-- Figures 5-7 About Here --

GDP per capita shows slightly different patterns of change across countries and time. For most countries in the region, GDP per capita is growing over time. The exceptions are the Philippines and, not surprisingly, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Singapore has the fastest growing economy and the highest rate of growth per capita. Malaysia is a distant second, and Thailand is not far behind with the third fastest growing economy over the period.

Urbanization shows the least variability across time. All countries in the region have experienced steady growth in the proportion of their residents living in urban area, but Thailand shows the third lowest rate of urbanization. The Philippines and Malaysia have the highest rates of urbanization, after the city-state of Singapore.

### **BIVARIATE COMPARISONS**

Table 4 shows the relationship among the measures of political and civil liberties and the other explanatory variables. The upper half of the table shows the correlations for countries in Southeast Asia. The lower half of the table includes estimates for all countries in Asia for which data are available. First, the measures of political and civil liberties are highly correlated with each other in the Southeast Asian region and even more so for all of Asia. The number of transnational organization secretariats in a country is also positively associated with greater political and civil liberties (the sign is negative in the table because a higher score on the liberty scales indicates less freedom).

The number of transnational organizations in each country is strongly correlated with the other measures of economic position and urban status. And, of all the explanatory variables, the number of transnational organizations is the one most strongly associated with increases in political and civil liberties. To explore the strength of these after controlling for other factors, a multivariate model is needed.

### **MULTIVARIATE MODELS**

To determine the extent to which transnational organizations might predict the level of political and civil liberties net of other factors, a multivariate ordinary least squares regression model is evaluated separately for political and civil liberties. The equation for the full model follows:

$$\text{Liberty}_t = f(\text{TNOs}_{t-1}, \text{FDI}_{t-1}, \text{GDP}_{t-1}, \text{URBAN}_{t-1})$$

All of our right-hand side variables are lagged by one year to address possible concerns of endogeneity. A random effects estimator controls for the possibility of within-country correlated errors and unobserved heterogeneity, and consequently adjusts the standard errors upwards. The models are estimated on evidence from six Southeast Asian countries over a twenty-four year period (1978-2002). Then the model is replicated on a larger sample of Asian countries over the same period. Similar patterns are found in the larger sample. More limited models are also evaluated for each of the other explanatory variables, taking into account unobserved heterogeneity at the country level.

## **CIVIL AND POLITICAL LIBERTIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA**

Tables 5 and 6 show the results of the multivariate analyses for countries in Southeast Asia. Model 1 displays the results for a regression including country-level effects and transnational organizations. The number of transnational organization secretariats is negatively and significantly associated with civil liberties. Since civil liberties are coded in reverse, the interpretation of the effect is such that an additional secretariat increases civil liberties by one-hundredth of a point. Ten new secretariats established in a country would reduce the civil liberties score by one-tenth, leading to a significant shift, but not a dramatic one. Such an increase in transnational organizations is observed, though, for Thailand where every two or three years there was a 10-unit increase in the number of secretariats.

-- Tables 5 and 6 About Here --

In model 2, foreign direct investment and GDP per capita show no significant relationship with political liberties (Table 6), while foreign direct investment increases civil liberties (Table 5). However, in models 4 and 5, foreign direct investment becomes an important predictor of civil liberties in tandem with the number of secretariats of transnational organizations. A one-percentage point increase in the rate of foreign direct investment to gross domestic product yields a seven-hundredths of an increase in civil liberties. Further, the effect of transnational organizations increases its strength by fifty percent (in Model 5).

Urbanization has little to no statistically significant effect on levels of civil liberties. In model 3 the effect is marginally significant – that is a one-percentage point increase in the urban population reduces limits on civil liberties by two-hundredths of a point. In model 4 the effect disappears when the measures of FDI and GDP are included.

The number of secretariats of transnational organizations has similar effects upon political liberties as it does upon civil liberties in Southeast Asian countries. As the number of transnational organizations increases the limitations on political liberties are significantly reduced or eliminated. The size of the effect is similar to its effect upon civil liberties. In a reduced model (Model 1), an increase of ten secretariats yields a one-tenth of a point reduction in the limitations to political liberties. In a full model, including controls for economic growth and urbanization (Model 4), the effect almost doubles.

As with civil liberties, economic status has no effect upon political liberties when it is included in a model without a measure of the presence of transnational organizations (Model 2). However, when transnational organizations are included in the model, economic status shows a different pattern from that for civil liberties. Instead of foreign direct investment influencing political liberties, gross domestic product per capita has a strong positive effect on reducing political liberties. A one percent increase in the per capita GDP rate increases limitations on political liberties by 1.2 points on the Freedom House scale. And urbanization demonstrates a strong relationship with political liberties.

When the results are replicated on the larger sample, the relationship between transnational organizations and political and civil liberties does not hold. However, increases in GDP per capita increases civil liberties, but lowers political liberties. GDP

seems to have grown in tandem with restrictions on political freedom because states were weary that too much democracy would impede the operations of “free” markets. However, as a larger percentage of the population became urbanized, both civil and political liberties rose. The ramifications of these results are discussed in the next section.

-- Tables 7 and 8 About Here --

#### **DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION: EXPLORING THE DIALECTIC BETWEEN GLOBAL CITY AND NATION-STATE**

The analysis began with a qualitative exploration of how transnational organizations carried and reinforced world-culture values into the Philippines and Thailand, resulting in their political and civil liberties at particular moments in time. These qualitative results were confirmed by a quantitative analysis of cross-national data from 1978-2002. The quantitative analysis provided strong evidence in support of the authors’ qualitative observations: Transnational organizations do function as world-culture carriers. But culture does not tell the whole story. Economic status played an important role in tandem with the influence of transnational organizations. When the analysis was extended to include a larger sample of countries from Asia, the effect of transnational organizations vanished. However, the country’s economic status continued to influence the levels of political and civil liberties.

What can be concluded from these results? First, the regional differences in the organization of material production and civil society are significantly different in East,

South, and Southeast Asia. These differences might significantly diffuse any effects transnational organizations on social and political development (Centeno and López-Alves 2001). Second, the measures deployed in this analysis lack the necessary refinement for examining how the world-culture values carried by TNOs affect nation-state policies specifically. Finally, we suggested that the influence of TNOs depends on their concentration in cities, but not just any city. Based on the authors' field experiences and the literature on global cities, we argued that specific regional cities may have sufficiently strong global ties to enable the city and its dwellers to challenge the nation-state.

In a first attempt to sketch this variability in the size, number, distribution, and concentration of transnational organizations within cities, we map the within-country concentration and distribution of transnational organizations in Southeast Asia for 2002 (the date for which we have the most reliable information by city). This variability may be a significant factor for explaining the timing and possibility for social change in the national polity as driven by a dialectic between the city and the nation-state. In the case of Thailand and the Philippines, both countries have large urban metropolises and few other cities. This is not the case in other countries in the region. Malaysia and Indonesia have several large and dispersed cities that attract transnational organizations. A next step in the analysis is to take into account this variability in the context of cities relative to their nation-states.

-- Map of Secretariats in Southeast Asia --

Even though world capital flows predict increases in civil and political liberties (the world-system position), we conclude that following the flow of financial capital is not enough. Instead, more attention must be paid to the cities where the ideological capacities for global commerce are concentrated. Future research should explore more fully the city's cultural and social ties that extend beyond the nation-state. In so doing, one can assess how the city finds the resources and the *legitimate* will to challenge the political and civil hierarchies therein. How are the city-based TNOs connected to other organizations in the world-polity and how does this world-wide distribution of ties affect the capacity of these cities to promote change? What is the role of the city relative to other cities within its nation-state? As more data become available and empirical measures become more refined, the processes of social change as well as the previously unrecognized drivers of that change may come to light.

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**TABLE 1: Political History of the Philippines, 1945-2002**

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Presidents</u>              | <u>Political Events</u>  |
|-------------|--------------------------------|--|
| 1946        | <i>Manuel Roxas</i>            | Japanese occupation ends and the Philippine Republic is established. Hukbalahap Movement (Huk Rebellion) is on going until 1953.   |
| 1953        | <i>Ramon Magsaysay</i>         | Focus is on United States-assisted reconstruction. Magsaysay styled himself as a man of the people.  |
| 1957        | <i>Carlos P. Garcia</i>        | Garcia pushes nationalist themes and negotiates with the U.S. over U.S. Military bases.  |
| 1961        | <i>Diosdado Macapagal</i>      | Macapagal seeks closer ties to neighboring Asian countries.  |
| 1965        | <i>Ferdinand E. Marcos</i>     |  |
| 1967        |                                | The Philippines cofounds ASEAN with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.   |
| 1969        |                                | Marcos is reelected in highly fraudulent elections.  |
| 1970        |                                | “Battle of Mendiola” erupts for a day when students try to take over the presidential palace and are violently fended off by riot police.  |
| 1971        |                                | A bomb kills 9 and injures 100 at a Liberal Party Rally. Officially, communists are blamed and habeas corpus is suspended, although the government is probably involved in this and other bombings.  |
| 1972        |                                | Marcos imposes martial law, precipitated by a government-staged attempt on the Minister of National Defence, Juan Ponce Enrile. Thousands of opposition figures including Benigno Aquino are arrested.   |
| 1981        |                                | Marcos lifts martial law but retains many of his repressive powers and tactics.  |
| 1983        |                                | Aquino is assassinated by government soldiers on returning from exile, a ‘lone communist gunman’ is officially blamed.   |
| 1986        | <i>Corazon Aquino</i>          | Massive ‘People’s Power’ demonstrations protesting Marcos’s claim to victory in widely fraudulent elections take place. Marcos flees to Hawaii.<br>Despite the instability produced by multiple coups during Aquino’s presidency, democratic institutions and civil liberties improve. |
| 1992        | <i>Fidel Ramos</i>             | Ramos declares ‘national reconciliation’ his focus.  |
| 1994        |                                | Ramos signs a law giving general amnesty to all rebel groups and Philippine military and police accused of crimes while fighting insurgents.   |
| 1996        |                                | Peace agreement is signed with one major Muslim insurgent group.   |
| 1998        | <i>Joseph Ejercito Estrada</i> | Estrada wins on a platform of poverty reduction and strict anti-crime measures.  |
| 2001        | <i>Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo</i> | A second successful ‘People’s Power’ revolution demanding Estrada leave office follows the failed impeachment trial against Estrada on corruption charges.   |
| 2002        |                                | Macapagal-Arroyo announces she will not run for a full term as president.  |

**TABLE 2: Political History of Thailand 1950-present, Reign of King Rama IX (Bhumibol)**

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Prime Ministers</u>       | <u>Political Events</u>  |
|-------------|------------------------------|--|
| 1950        | Pibul Songgram               |  |
| 1951        |                              | Renunciation of the 1949 constitution and reestablishment of the 1932 constitution   |
| 1954        |                              | Established as the Seat of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Military bases offered SEATO's use.   |
| 1957        | Gen. Thanom Kittikachorn     | Military coup led by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat  |
| 1958        | Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat | Suspension of the constitution and declaration of martial law.   |
| 1959        |                              | Interim constitution proclaimed by King  |
| 1961        |                              | Formation of Association of Southeast Asia (with Philippines, Malaya)  |
| 1963        |                              | Death of Sarit.  |
| 1963        | Gen. Thanom Kittikachorn     |  |
| 1968        |                              | New constitution promulgated. By the end of 1960s growing economic woes and communist insurgency.  |
| 1971        |                              | Coup by Thanom abolished the constitution and established military rule.   |
| 1972        |                              | Interim constitution which gave military strong presence in senate. Led to growing student and activist protests.  |
| 1973        | Sanya Thammasak              | A week of student protests and the killing of 75 students toppled Thanom government, first civilian premier appointed.   |
| 1974        |                              | New constitution   |
| 1975        | Kukrit Pramoj                |  |
| 1975        |                              | Anticommunist legislation used to arrest labor organizers and student leaders.   |
| 1976        | Thanin Kraivichien           | Resignation of Kukrit. Military coup   |
| 1977        | Gen. Kriensak Chomanand      | Slight expansion of freedom of the press.  |
| 1978        |                              | New constitution promulgated.  |
| 1980        | Gen. Prem Tinsulanonda       |  |
| 1981        |                              | Military coup attempt failed.  |
| 1985        |                              | Military coup attempt failed.  |
| 1988        | Gen. Chatichai Choonhaven    | Resignation of Prem.   |
| 1991        |                              | Military coup succeeds   |
| 1992        |                              | Anti government protesters for one month, killing of 50 protesters led to the toppling of the military-controlled government.  |
| 1992        | Chuan Leekpai                | First election of a civilian premier.  |
| 1995        |                              | New constitutional reforms, lowered the voting age to 18, guaranteed equal rights for women and diminished the presence of the military in the senate.   |
| 1996        | Banharn Silpa-archa          | New elections and a seven-party coalition  |
| 1996        | Chavalit Yongchaiyudh        | New elections.   |
| 1997        | Chuan Leekpai                | New elections. New constitution. Shift from representative democracy towards participatory democracy, independent election commission established, separation of powers within the state, expansion of individual rights and liberties |
| 2001        | Thaksin Shinawatra           |  |

**TABLE 3-** A Sample of the International Organizations Included in the Analysis, by UIA-defined Type

**Type A: Federation of International Organizations**

| <b>Organization</b> | <b>Purpose</b>   |
|---------------------|--|
| United Nations      | “To maintain international peace and security... to promot[e] respect for human rights ....” |

**Type B: Universal Membership**

| <b>Organization</b>   | <b>Purpose</b>  |
|---|---|
| Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)                                 | Contribute towards “an expanding world economy and ensuring humanity’s freedom from hunger.”                            |
| International Labor Organization (ILO)                                  | “Raise the working standards and living standards throughout the world.”  |
| United Nations Economic, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) | “Contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture.” |
| World Health Organization (WHO)   | UN agency responsible for international health and public health matters.   |

**Type C: Inter-Continental Membership**

| <b>Organization</b>                                  | <b>Purpose</b>   |
|--|--|
| International Medical Parliamentarians Organizations | “Promote cooperation in law and policy making... on issues of concern to world health and medical care.” |

**Type D: Regionally Defined Membership**

| <b>Organization</b>                                | <b>Purpose</b>                               |
|--|--|
| Asia-Pacific Academic Consortium for Public Health | “Improve the quality of life in the region.” |
| Inter-Pacific Bar Association                      | Promote the rule of law.                     |

**Type F: Organizations Having Special Form, Including Funds and Foundations**

| <b>Organization</b>  | <b>Purpose</b>   |
|--|--|
| Ford Foundation  | “Serve, in its capacity of philanthropic institution, the public welfare.”             |
| International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) | “Help reduce global poverty and promote the economic development of member countries.” |

Source: Union of International Associations. 1999/2000. *Yearbook of International Organizations*. Edition 36

**TABLE 4-** Correlation Coefficients Among Civil Liberty, Political Liberty, Transnational Organizations, Foreign Direct Investment, GDP per capita, and Urbanization (N)

|                | Civil liberty      | Political liberty | TNOs              | FDI              | GDP              | Urban            |        |
|----------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|--------|
| Southeast Asia | Political liberty  | .881***<br>(198)  |                   |                  |                  |                  |        |
|                | TNOs               | -.734***<br>(180) | -.668***<br>(180) |                  |                  |                  |        |
|                | FDI                | -.035<br>(180)    | -.023<br>(180)    | .162**<br>(180)  |                  |                  |        |
|                | GDP                | -.429***<br>(165) | -.422***<br>(165) | .626***<br>(165) | .583***<br>(165) |                  |        |
|                | Urban              | -.304***<br>(180) | -.295***<br>(180) | .484***<br>(180) | .672***<br>(180) | .873***<br>(165) | --     |
|                | Mean               | 5.081             | 4.803             | 35               | 2.919            | 7.030            | 35.268 |
|                | Standard deviation | 1.346             | 1.735             | 33               | 3.659            | 1.321            | 26.361 |
| Minimum        | 2                  | 2                 | 0                 | -1.961           | 5.193            | 12.374           |        |
| Maximum        | 7                  | 7                 | 115               | 15.203           | 10.170           | 100.00           |        |
| Asia           | Political liberty  | .896***<br>(352)  |                   |                  |                  |                  |        |
|                | TNOs               | -.599***<br>(320) | -.535***<br>(320) |                  |                  |                  |        |
|                | FDI                | .218***<br>(322)  | .228***<br>(322)  | .012<br>(320)    |                  |                  |        |
|                | GDP                | -.526***<br>(307) | -.396***<br>(307) | .576***<br>(305) | .315***<br>(307) |                  |        |
|                | Urban              | -.436***<br>(322) | -.327***<br>(322) | .484***<br>(320) | .442***<br>(322) | .905***<br>(307) | --     |
|                | Mean               | 4.514             | 4.108             | 39               | 1.886            | 6.956            | 36.194 |
|                | Standard deviation | 1.619             | 2.016             | 42               | 3.072            | 1.612            | 25.678 |
| Minimum        | 1                  | 1                 | 0                 | -1.961           | 4.994            | 6.548            |        |
| Maximum        | 7                  | 7                 | 198               | 15.203           | 10.670           | 100.00           |        |

\*p<.05 \*\*p<.01 \*\*\*p<.001 (one-tailed test)

*Notes:* Civil liberty = a scale score, with decreases in the score representing greater civil liberty; Political liberty= a scale score, with decreases in the score representing greater political freedoms; TNOs=number of transnational organizations (t-1); FDI = inflows of foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP (t-1); GDP is per capita, logged (t-1); Urban = Percent of population living in urban areas (t-1). Sample definitions: Southeast Asia includes Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. The Asia sample adds China, India, Japan, South Korea, Nepal, Pakistan, and Bangladesh to the Southeast Asia sample.

**TABLE 5-** Standardized Coefficients from Random Effects OLS Regression of Civil Liberties on Transnational Organizations, World-system Position, and Urbanization in Southeast Asia, 1980-2002.

| Independent Variable          | Model 1          | Model 2          | Model 3                      | Model 4           | Model 5            |
|-------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| <i>World Culture Carriers</i> |                  |                  |                              |                   |                    |
| TNOs                          | -.010*<br>(.004) | --               | --                           | -.016**<br>(.005) | -.019***<br>(.005) |
| <i>World Systems Position</i> |                  |                  |                              |                   |                    |
| FDI                           | --               | -.054*<br>(.026) | --                           | -.074**<br>(.026) | -.075**<br>(.026)  |
| GDP per capita (logged)       | --               | -.204<br>(.173)  | --                           | .351<br>(.250)    | .098<br>(.179)     |
| <i>Global Cities</i>          |                  |                  |                              |                   |                    |
| Urbanization                  | --               | --               | -.024 <sup>a</sup><br>(.013) | -.017<br>(.012)   | --                 |
| R <sup>2</sup>                | .517             | .089             | .105                         | .269              | .470               |
| ρ                             | .503             | .536             | .809                         | .585              | .486               |
| Number of cases               | 180              | 165              | 180                          | 165               | 165                |
| Number of countries           | 9                | 9                | 9                            | 9                 | 9                  |

Year dummies are not shown in table. Standard errors in parentheses.

\*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001 (two-tailed tests)

<sup>a</sup>p=0.066

**TABLE 6-** Standardized Coefficients from Random Effects OLS Regression Estimations of Political liberties on transnational networks organizations, world-system position, and urbanization in Southeast Asia, 1980-2002.

| Independent Variable          | Model 1          | Model 2         | Model 3         | Model 4            | Model 5            |
|-------------------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| <i>World Culture Carriers</i> |                  |                 |                 |                    |                    |
| TNOs                          | -.012*<br>(.006) | --              | --              | -.022**<br>(.007)  | -.025***<br>(.007) |
| <i>World Systems Position</i> |                  |                 |                 |                    |                    |
| FDI                           | --               | -.015<br>(.034) | --              | -.036<br>(.032)    | -.044<br>(.033)    |
| GDP per capita (logged)       | --               | .181<br>(.283)  | --              | 1.257***<br>(.359) | .694*<br>(.309)    |
| <i>Global Cities</i>          |                  |                 |                 |                    |                    |
| Urbanization                  | --               | --              | -.025<br>(.017) | -.046**<br>(.017)  | --                 |
| R <sup>2</sup>                | .461             | .060            | .099            | .021               | .090               |
| ρ                             | .604             | .682            | .805            | .757               | .714               |
| Number of cases               | 180              | 165             | 180             | 165                | 165                |
| Number of countries           | 9                | 9               | 9               | 9                  | 9                  |

Year dummies are not shown in table. Standard errors in parentheses.

\*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001 (two-tailed tests)

**TABLE 7-** Standardized Coefficients from random effects OLS regression of civil liberties on transnational networks organizations, world-system position, and urbanization in Asia, 1980-2002.

| Independent Variable          | Model 1        | Model 2                      | Model 3            | Model 4                      | Model 5                      |
|-------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------|--------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| <i>World Culture Carriers</i> |                |                              |                    |                              |                              |
| TNOs                          | .004<br>(.003) | --                           | --                 | .0004<br>(.003)              | .0004<br>(.003)              |
| <i>World Systems Position</i> |                |                              |                    |                              |                              |
| FDI                           | --             | -.039 <sup>a</sup><br>(.022) | --                 | -.042 <sup>b</sup><br>(.022) | -.039 <sup>c</sup><br>(.023) |
| GDP per capita (logged)       | --             | -.434***<br>(.116)           | --                 | -.029<br>(.193)              | -.433***<br>(.124)           |
| <i>Global Cities</i>          |                |                              |                    |                              |                              |
| Urbanization                  | --             | --                           | -.038***<br>(.010) | -.031**<br>(.011)            | --                           |
| R <sup>2</sup>                | .187           | .226                         | .198               | .125                         | .214                         |
| ρ                             | .784           | .610                         | .864               | .656                         | .623                         |
| Number of cases               | 320            | 307                          | 322                | 305                          | 305                          |
| Number of countries           | 16             | 16                           | 16                 | 16                           | 16                           |

Year dummies are not shown in table. Standard errors in parentheses.

\*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001 (two-tailed tests)

<sup>a</sup>p=.079

<sup>b</sup>p=.060

<sup>c</sup>p=.081

**TABLE 8-** Standardized Coefficients from random effects OLS regression of political liberties on transnational networks organizations, world-system position, and urbanization in Asia, 1980-2002.

| Independent Variable          | Model 1         | Model 2         | Model 3          | Model 4            | Model 5         |
|-------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|--------------------|-----------------|
| <i>World Culture Carriers</i> |                 |                 |                  |                    |                 |
| TNOs                          | .0002<br>(.003) | --              | --               | -.003<br>(.004)    | -.002<br>(.004) |
| <i>World Systems Position</i> |                 |                 |                  |                    |                 |
| FDI                           | --              | .014<br>(.030)  | --               | .005<br>(.030)     | .007<br>(.030)  |
| GDP per capita (logged)       | --              | -.154<br>(.183) | --               | .584*<br>(.278)    | -.079<br>(.199) |
| <i>Global Cities</i>          |                 |                 |                  |                    |                 |
| Urbanization                  | --              | --              | -.027*<br>(.013) | -.053***<br>(.016) | --              |
| R <sup>2</sup>                | .002            | .182            | .113             | .016               | .223            |
| ρ                             | .793            | .710            | .855             | .762               | .739            |
| Number of cases               | 320             | 307             | 322              | 305                | 305             |
| Number of countries           | 16              | 16              | 16               | 16                 | 16              |

Year dummies are not shown in table. Standard errors in parentheses.

\*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001 (two-tailed tests)











Figure 6: Gross Domestic Product Per Capita in Southeast Asian Countries, 1980-1999



